Appendix 13A. World nuclear forces, 2006

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Page 1

Appendix 13A. World nuclear forces, 2006

SHANNON N. KILE, VITALY FEDCHENKO and

HANS M. KRISTENSEN

I. Introduction

While world attention is focused on the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea,

eight states possess about 12 100 operational nuclear weapons (see table 13A.1).

Several thousand nuclear weapons are kept on high alert, ready to be launched within

minutes. If all nuclear warheads are counted—operational warheads, spares, and

those in both active and inactive storage—the United States, Russia, the United

Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel together possess a total of more

than 27 000 warheads.

None of the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, as defined by the 1968

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), appears to be planning to disarm its nuclear arsenal

in the foreseeable future.

Russia and the USA are in the process of reducing their

operational nuclear forces as a result of two bilateral treaties—the 1991 Strategic

Arms Reduction Treaty (START I Treaty) and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduc-

tions Treaty (SORT).

In the USA, implementation of the 2001 Nuclear Posture

Review (NPR)

has begun on all aspects of the nuclear postures. This includes a

reduction by ‘almost half’ of the total stockpile by 2012 and the development of new

ballistic missiles, strategic submarines, long-range bombers, new or modified nuclear

weapons, nuclear weapon production facilities, nuclear command and control sys-

tems, and modified nuclear war plans. Similarly, Russia has announced its plan to

reduce mainly land-based strategic missiles but also to retain for another decade,

rather than dismantling, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with

multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). A new ICBM, a new

class of strategic submarines and a new cruise missile are being introduced.

Tables 13A.2 and 13A.3 show the composition of the deployed nuclear forces of the

USA and Russia, respectively.

On developments in world nuclear forces see Kile, S. N. and Kristensen, H. M., ‘World nuclear

forces, 2005’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford

University Press: Oxford, 2005), pp. 578–602, and previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook. For a dis-

cussion of the national governance of nuclear weapons in these 8 states see chapter 5 in this volume.

According to the NPT, only states that manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 Jan.

1967 are recognized as nuclear weapon states. By this definition, China, France, Russia, the UK and the

USA are the nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT.

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) was

signed in 1991 by the USA and the USSR; it entered into force on 5 Dec. 1994 for Russia and the USA

(under the 1992 Lisbon Protocol, which entered into force on 5 Dec. 1994, Belarus, Kazakhstan and

Ukraine also assumed the obligations of the former USSR under the treaty). For the treaty see URL

<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/toc.html>. SORT was signed by Russia and the

USA in 2002; it entered into force on 1 June 2003 and is available at URL <http://www.state.gov/t/

ac/trt/18016.htm>. On the implications of SORT see ‘Special Section’, Arms Control Today, vol. 32,

no. 5 (June 2002), pp. 3–23.

See ‘Nuclear Posture Review [excerpts], submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001’, 8 Jan. 2002,

URL <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>.

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Table 13A.1. World nuclear forces, by number of deployed warheads, January 2006

Strategic

Non-strategic

Total number

Country

warheads

of warheads

USA

5 021

500

5 521

Russia

3 352

2 330

5 682

185

–

185

France

348

–

348

China130

130

India

–

Pakistan

–

Israel

–

100–200

Total12 100

North Korea claimed in 2005 that it had developed nuclear weapons, although there is no

public information to verify this claim.

The total US stockpile, including reserves, contains c. 10 000 warheads. In addition,

5000 plutonium cores (pits) are in storage as a strategic reserve, while another 7000 pits make

up most of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium declared in excess of military needs.

The total Russian stockpile contains roughly 16 000 warheads, of which c. 10 100 are in

storage and/or awaiting dismantlement.

Some warheads on British strategic submarines have sub-strategic missions.

The existence of operational Chinese non-strategic warheads is uncertain.

The stockpiles of India, Pakistan and Israel are thought to be only partly deployed.

The nuclear arsenals of China, the UK and France are considerably smaller than

those of the USA and Russia. Data on their delivery vehicles and nuclear warhead

stockpiles are presented in tables 13A.4–13A.6. China is about to deploy a new gen-

eration of strategic missiles, but it remains unclear whether it intends to deploy a sig-

nificantly larger strategic nuclear force or a more modern force of relatively the same

size. France is currently engaged in developing and deploying a new generation of

nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs) and air-launched nuclear weapons, although the number of opera-

tional warheads may decrease somewhat with the introduction of the new SLBM

around 2010. Unlike any of the other nuclear weapon states, France continues to

deploy nuclear weapons on its surface fleet in peacetime. The British nuclear weapon

stockpile has levelled out at about 200 warheads: the UK is the only one of the five

nuclear weapon states that is not known to have new nuclear weapon systems under

development. Yet, the UK appears to have begun a multi-year programme to extend

the service life of the warhead on the Trident II (D-5) SLBM, and it will soon face a

decision about the future of its nuclear deterrent after the Trident system reaches the

end of its scheduled service life.

It is particularly difficult to obtain public information about the nuclear arsenals of

the three states that are not parties to the NPT—India, Pakistan and Israel. The infor-

mation that is available is limited and often contradictory. India and Pakistan are both

expanding their operational nuclear strike capabilities, while Israel appears to be

waiting to see how the situation in Iran develops. Tables 13A.7–13A.9 provide infor-

mation about the status of the Indian, Pakistani and Israeli nuclear arsenals.

The figures in the tables are estimates based on public information and contain

some uncertainties, as reflected in the notes.

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II. US nuclear forces

As of January 2006, the USA maintained an estimated stockpile of approximately

5500 active or operational nuclear warheads,

consisting of more than 5000 strategic

and 500 non-strategic warheads. Another 215 warheads are spares. More than

4200 inactive warheads are in reserve, for a total stockpile of about 10 000 warheads.

Of the current US stockpile, more than 4000 warheads are expected to be retired

for dismantlement by 2012 as a result of the 2004 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan.

Most of these warheads will come from the large reserve of inactive warheads, while

a smaller number will come from warheads removed from operational status as a

result of SORT implementation. This will leave a stockpile of nearly 6000 warheads.

Because SORT does not include verification measures, and because the START I

Treaty expires in 2009, monitoring the development of Russian and US strategic

nuclear forces will be increasingly difficult. Much like during the cold war, satellite

surveillance and human intelligence will once again be the primary means with which

the world’s two largest nuclear weapon powers monitor—and potentially misunder-

stand—each other’s nuclear force developments.

In parallel with adjusting the nuclear forces, the US Department of Defense (DOD)

has upgraded its nuclear strike plans to reflect new presidential guidance and a transi-

tion in war planning from the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) of the cold

war to a set of smaller and more flexible strike plans designed to defeat today’s

adversaries. The new central strategic war plan is known as OPLAN (Operations

Plan) 8044. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Meyers

described some of the planning changes in congressional testimony in February 2005:

‘[US Strategic Command] has revised our strategic deterrence and response plan that

became effective in the fall of 2004. This revised, detailed plan provides more

flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adver-

saries in a wider range of contingencies’.

One example of this adjustment is CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022, a plan for the

quick use of nuclear, conventional, or information warfare capabilities to destroy—

pre-emptively, if necessary—‘time-urgent targets’ anywhere in the world. Defense

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued an Alert Order in early 2004 that directed the

military to put CONPLAN 8022 into effect. As a result, the pre-emption policy of the

administration of President George W. Bush is now operational for long-range bomb-

ers, strategic submarines and presumably ICBMs.

Land-based ballistic missiles

On the basis of the estimate for January 2006, the US ICBM force was reduced in

2005 by 10 missiles with the retirement of the Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM. The

500 W87 warheads from the 50 retired Peacekeeper missiles will be modified to

replace W62 warheads on Minuteman ICBMs beginning in financial year (FY) 2006.

With a yield of 310 kt, the W87 is nearly twice as powerful as the W62, which will

This estimate for operational warheads is 600 warheads above the estimate for 2005 owing to new

information about the composition of the active and inactive stockpiles. See Kile and Kristensen

(note 1), p. 580.

Myers, R. B., General, US Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Posture Statement

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 Feb. 2005, URL <http://www.senate.gov/armed_

services/statemnt/2005/February/Myers%2002-17-05.pdf>, p. 32.

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broaden the range of hardened targets that can be held at risk with the Minuteman

force. The W62 will be retired by 2009. During 2005 work continued on modernizing

the guidance and propulsion systems of the Minuteman ICBM force.

The USA abandoned the START II Treaty in 2002 and now plans to retain a

multiple warhead capability for its ICBM force. The number of warheads deployed

on ICBMs will be reduced to 500 to comply with the SORT ceiling of no more than

2200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012. However, hundreds of

additional ICBM warheads will be retained in the ‘responsive force’ reserve for

potential uploading onto Minuteman missiles.

Four Minuteman IIIs were test-launched in 2005 from Vandenberg Air Force Base

(AFB) in California; three with a single re-entry vehicle and one with three re-entry

vehicles. One of the missiles with a single re-entry vehicle (from Malmstrom AFB)

was a demonstration test for adapting the W87 warhead from the retired MX/Peace-

keeper for deployment on the Minuteman III.

Work is continuing on designing a new ICBM to begin replacing Minuteman III

missiles from 2018. The Mission Need Statement (MNS) for the new ICBM states

that nuclear weapons will ‘continue to play a unique and indispensable role in US

security policy’ and that a credible and effective land-based nuclear deterrent force

‘beyond 2020’ will ‘prepare the US for an uncertain future by maintaining US quali-

tative superiority in nuclear war-fighting capabilities in the 2020–2040 time frame’.

Ballistic missile submarines

The Trident I (C-4) SLBM was retired in October 2005 after 26 years of service when

the USS Alabama offloaded the last 24 operational C-4 missiles. The Alabama, along

with three other former C-4-equipped SSBNs, will be converted to carry the longer-

range and more accurate D-5 SLBM. The USS Alaska and USS Nevada have already

been converted, while USS Henry M. Jackson and USS Alabama will be converted in

2006 and 2007, respectively.

The build-up of the SSBN force in the Pacific continued in 2005 with the transfer

of two more boats from Kings Bay in Georgia to Bangor in Washington. The USS

Louisiana arrived in its new homeport at Bangor in October, followed by the USS

Maine in November. The transfers boost the Pacific SSBN fleet to nine boats, leaving

only five SSBNs in the Atlantic, the lowest number there since ballistic missile-

equipped submarines were first deployed to sea, in 1961. The SSBNs are being trans-

ferred to increase targeting of China, although SSBNs in the Pacific also target Russia

and North Korea.

The US Navy purchased five more D-5 SLBMs in the FY 2006 budget, and pro-

duction of the missile has been extended through 2013 for a total of 561 missiles. The

development of a Life Extension (LE) programme for 108 older D-5s will allow them

to match the service life of the Trident SSBN force, which has been extended through

2042.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review decided to reduce the ICBM force by 50 missiles, to

450 missiles, beginning in FY 2007. US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 Feb. 2006, URL <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report2006

0203.pdf>.

US Department of the Air Force, HQ, Air Force Space Command/Data Records Management, ‘Final

Mission Need Statement (MNS), AFSPC 001-00: Land-Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrent’, Acquisition

Category One (ACAT I), 18 Jan. 2002, p. 2.

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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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Five D-5 missiles were flight-tested in 2005, four from two US SSBNs and one

from a British SSBN. The first test, carried out from the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734)

off Florida in March, involved the launch of a missile in the shortest trajectory ever

flown by a US SLBM: 1200 nautical miles (2222 km). The re-entry vehicle was

equipped with an ‘accuracy adjunct’, using a three-axis flap system developed by

Lockheed Martin, which enabled manoeuvring of the re-entry vehicle to ‘GPS-like

accuracy’ (within 10 metres). Both nuclear and conventional warhead strikes were

simulated.

The modernization of the W76 warhead continues with three specific efforts under

way. One involves an LE programme that inter alia replaces the arming, firing and

fuzing (AF&F) system on the W76/Mk4 re-entry vehicle to add a ground-burst capa-

bility that will significantly enhance the lethality of the weapon against harder targets.

The modified warhead, which will be called the W76-1, may permit a reduction of

the explosive yield. A second effort involves adding the ‘accuracy adjunct’ to the

Mk4 re-entry vehicle to enhance the effectiveness of the W76-1/Mk4 and to enable

deployment of conventional warheads on the Trident II (D-5) SLBM. The third effort

involves a design incorporating the W76-1 on the larger Mk5 re-entry vehicle

normally used for the W88 warhead in order to relax the design constraints required

when using the smaller Mk4 re-entry vehicle.

Long-range bombers

The size of the US bomber force remained unchanged in 2005, but the aircraft and

their nuclear weapons continued to be upgraded.

The US Air Force is replacing its bombers’ ultra-high frequency (UHF) and very-

high frequency (VHF) radios and satellite communications (SATCOM) with a new

communications system to receive beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) voice and data. This

will allow crews to review full mission plans en route to their targets. An Extremely

High Frequency (EHF) satellite communication will also be added to ensure that the

bombers have secure BLOS communications in its nuclear mission.

The installation of the Avionics Midlife Improvement (AMI) on the B-52H, which is

the only carrier of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the advanced cruise

missile (ACM), began in 2005 to improve the aircraft’s navigation and nuclear

weapon delivery capabilities. The installation work is expected to be completed in

September 2008. The existing Air Force satellite communications (AFSATCOM)

radio will also be replaced by EHF radio to improve communications in nuclear strike

scenarios.

The US Air Force is studying options for a new long-range strike aircraft to even-

tually replace the current bomber force. It is also studying options for a next-

generation nuclear cruise missile. One possibility is a multi-service enhanced cruise

missile (ECM) with a nuclear payload and longer range to support global strike

missions against ‘targets deep within future high threat anti-access environments’,

according to Air Force documents. Delivery is envisioned from bombers or from vari-

ous ground- or sea-based platforms.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review decided to replace nuclear warheads on 24 Trident II (D-5)

missiles with conventional warheads for deployment in 2008. The intention is to mix conventional and

nuclear missiles throughout the SSBN fleet—a plan which, if approved by Congress, could have a sig-

nificant impact on crisis stability if the launch of a conventionally armed D-5 SLBM were misinterpreted

by a nuclear adversary as a pre-emptive nuclear strike. US Department of Defense (note 7).

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Table 13A.2. US nuclear forces, January 2006

No.

Year first Range

Warheads

Type

Designation deployed deployed (km)

x yield

Warheads

Strategic forces

Bombers

B-52H

Stratofortress

85/56

1961

16 000

ALCM 5–150 kt

1 000

ACM 5–150 kt

400

B-2

Spirit

21/16

1994

11 000

Bombs

555

Subtotal

106/72

1 955

ICBMs

LGM-30G

Minuteman III

Mk-12

1970

13 000

3 x 170 kt

150

1 x 170 kt

150

Mk-12A

300

1979

13 000

2–3 x 335 kt

750

Subtotal

500

1 050

SSBNs/SLBMs

UGM-133A Trident II (D-5)

Mk-4

n.a.

1992

>7 400

6 x 100 kt

1 632

Mk-5

n.a.

1990

>7 400

6 x 475 kt

384

Subtotal

336

2 016

Strategic subtotal

5 021

Non-strategic forces

B61-3, -4, -10 bombs

n.a.

1979

n.a.

0.3–170 kt

400

Tomahawk SLCM

320

1984

2 500

1 x 5–150 kt

100

Non-strategic subtotal

500

Total

5 521

Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

The first figure in the No. deployed column is the total number of B-52Hs in the inven-

tory, including those for training, test and reserve. The second figure is for PMI (primary

mission inventory) aircraft, i.e., the number of operational aircraft assigned for nuclear and

conventional wartime missions.

Another 360 ALCM warheads are in reserve.

Available for both the B-52H and the B-2A.

The Peacekeeper ICBM was retired in Sep. 2005. The planned downloading of all Min-

uteman ICBMs to a single warhead to meet the SORT-mandated force ceiling may already

have taken place. The W62 (Mk-12) will be retired by 2009.

Each of the 150 Minuteman III missiles of the 90th Space Wing at F.E. Warren AFB was

downloaded from 3 to 1 W62 warhead in 2001.

Two of 14 SSBNs are undergoing conversion from the C-4 missile, which was retired in

Oct. 2005, to the D-5. Although D-5 missiles are counted under START I as carrying 8 war-

heads each, the US Navy completed a preliminary download in 2005 (to an average of 6 war-

heads per missile) and will conduct an additional download later to meet the SORT-mandated

force ceiling in 2012.

Approximately 440 bombs (including inactive weapons) are deployed in Europe.

Another 200 W80-0s are in inactive storage. The TLAM/N is no longer deployed at sea

but is stored on land.

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Another 215 warheads are spares and more than 4220 warheads are kept in the inactive

stockpile for a total stockpile of approximately 10 000 warheads. In addition, more than

12 000 plutonium pits are stored at the Pantex Plant in Texas.

Sources: US Department of Defense, various budget reports and press releases; US Depart-

ment of Energy, various budget reports; US Department of State, START I Treaty MOUs,

1990 through July 2005; US Department of Defense, various documents obtained under the

Freedom of Information Act; US Navy, personal communication; ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; US Naval Institute, Proceedings, various

issues; and Authors’ estimates.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

As of January 2006, the USA retained approximately 500 active non-strategic nuclear

warheads. These consisted of 400 B61 gravity bombs and 100 W80-0 warheads for

Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAM/Ns). Another 790 non-strategic war-

heads are in inactive storage. Despite the significant number of warheads, neither the

2001 NPR nor SORT addresses non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The most significant change in 2005 was that all of the B61-10 bombs are now

considered part of the inactive stockpile. Some of these weapons are still deployed in

Europe together with B61-3/4 bombs. A total of 440 B61 non-strategic nuclear bombs

are forward-deployed at eight airbases in six European NATO member states (Bel-

gium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the UK). The aircraft of non-

nuclear weapon NATO countries that are assigned nuclear strike missions with US

nuclear weapons include Belgian and Dutch F-16 and German and Italian Tornado

combat aircraft.

Only 100 W80-0 warheads for the TLAM/N are active; another 200 are in inactive

storage. TLAM/Ns are earmarked for deployment on selected Los Angeles, Improved

Los Angeles and Virginia Class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The

weapon is not deployed at sea under normal circumstances, but it can be redeployed

within 30 days of a decision to do so.

Nuclear warhead stockpile management and modernization

The total US stockpile of roughly 10 000 warheads is organized in two categories:

active and inactive warheads. The active category includes intact warheads with all

components that are either deployed on operational delivery systems or are part of the

‘responsive force’ of reserve warheads that can be deployed on operational delivery

systems in a relatively short time. The inactive category includes warheads that are

held in long-term storage as a reserve with their limited life components (tritium)

removed. As SORT and the 2004 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan are implemented

over the next six years, the ‘responsive force’ will contain roughly three times as

many warheads as there are operationally deployed warheads. In addition to the

10 000 active and inactive warheads, the USA keeps about 5000 plutonium cores

(pits) in storage at the Pantex Plant in Texas as a strategic reserve. Approximately the

same number of canned assemblies (thermonuclear secondaries) are kept at the Oak

Ridge Y-12 Plant in Tennessee. Another 7000 pits held at Pantex make up most of

On the history and status of US nuclear weapons in Europe see Kristensen, H. M., ‘US nuclear

weapons in Europe,’ Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 2005, URL <http://www.

nrdc.org/nuclear/euro.contents.asp>.

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the 34 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium previously declared in excess of military

needs by the administration of President Bill Clinton. All of these 12 000 pits come

from retired warheads.

III. Russian nuclear forces

Land-based ballistic missiles

The ICBMs assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) have traditionally made up

the largest element of the Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear forces. As of January 2006,

the SRF consisted of three missile armies, with a total 13 missile divisions: the

27th Guards Missile Army (headquarters in Vladimir, five divisions), the 31st Missile

Army (Orenburg, three divisions) and the 33rd Guards Missile Army (Omsk, five

divisions).

In 2005, the SRF eliminated two missile divisions and decommissioned

36 SS-18s, 14 SS-19s, 36 SS-25s and all 15 remaining SS-24 missiles.

According to

the long-term plan for Russia’s strategic forces, made public at the end of 2004, the

SRF will eventually deploy only the SS-27 Topol-M missile, while all other ICBMs

will be gradually decommissioned.

The SS-27 Topol-M missile is a solid-propellant three-stage ICBM and has been

developed in both road-mobile (RS-12M1) and silo-based (RS-12M2) versions. The

latter began to be deployed in 1997 with the 60th Missile Division in Tatischevo,

Saratov oblast, as a replacement for the SS-19 missiles based there. As of early 2005,

this division had four regiments armed with 10 RS-12M2 missiles each. Two more

Topol-Ms were added in December 2005.

Russia will have to deploy on average

four or five missiles per year to fulfil its plan to have 64 RS-12M2 missiles on duty

by 2010.

According to the 2006 State Defence Order, Russia will procure six Topol-M

missiles in 2006, compared with four in 2005.

Three of these will be road-mobile

RS-12M1 missiles scheduled for deployment with the 54th Missile Division in

Teikovo, Ivanovo region, by December 2006.

Russia plans to have 15 such missiles

by 2010.

On 1 November 2005 the SRF successfully launched an RS-12M1 Topol-M missile

from the Kapustin Yar test range in Astrakhan’ region to the Balkhash test range in

Kazakhstan. The launch reportedly tested a new hypersonic re-entry vehicle (RV) that

‘Strategic Rocket Forces’, Russian Nuclear Forces Project, 17 Dec. 2005, URL <http://www.

russianforces.org/eng/missiles/>.

Kile and Kristensen (note 1), pp. 586–87.

Poroskov, N., ‘“V god budem sokrachshyat’ po odnoy-dve raketnye divizii”’ [‘We will be decom-

missioning one or two missile divisions a year’], Vremya Novostey, 6 May 2005, URL <http://www.

vremya.ru/2005/78/4/124290.html>.

Dolinin, A., ‘Khraniteli derzhavy’ [The guardians of the state], Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 Jan. 2006,

URL <http://www.redstar.ru/2006/01/31_01/1_01.html>.

Safronov, I., ‘Russian missiles will die of old age’, Kommersant, 1 Apr. 2005, URL <http://www.

kommersant.com/page.asp?id=559554>.

‘Fradkov distributes defense order’, Kommersant, 1 Dec. 2005, URL <http://www.kommersant.

com/doc.asp?idr=527&id=631438>; and Kile and Kristensen (note 1), p. 587.

Safronov, I., ‘Moskva ispytala assimetrichnyi otvet’ [Moscow has tested an asymmetrical

response], Kommersant, 2 Nov. 2005.

Safronov (note 15).

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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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is capable of manoeuvring in flight in order to penetrate missile defence systems.

President Vladimir Putin has stated on several occasions that Russia was developing a

new nuclear missile system ‘which had no counterpart elsewhere in the world’ and

would be able to defeat any strategic missile defence system. Many observers believe

that Putin was referring to the manoeuvrable RV for the Topol-M. The commander of

the SRF, Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, has stated that the new RV will be

deployed on Topol-M missiles beginning in 2006 and later on a new SLBM, the

SS-NX-30 ‘Bulava’ (R-30).

He also indicated that the Topol-M could be equipped

with multiple warheads, if a decision to do so were to be made by the political leader-

ship.

The SRF plans to continue to deploy the SS-18 ‘Satan’ (R-36M) heavy ICBM for

another 10–15 years, and possibly longer. Under the terms of the abandoned

START II Treaty, Russia was committed to scrapping all of its SS-18s, which can

carry up to 10 warheads each. As of January 2006, Russia had on combat duty

74 SS-18s, in two versions: the R-36MUTTKh and the R-36M2 Voevoda.

The for-

mer was first deployed in 1979–83 and the latter in 1988–92. They are silo-based,

two-stage liquid-propellant ICBMs produced by the Yuzhnoe Machine-Building

Plant in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.

In December 2004 Russia successfully test-launched an R-36M2 missile, which

had been on combat alert for 16 years, as part of a programme to extend the service

life of the R-36M2. In the summer of 2005 the SRF performed additional main-

tenance operations, which extended the service lives of its approximately 40 R-36M2

missiles until at least 2016.

On 26 December 2005 Solovtsov announced that Russia

and Ukraine would sign an agreement on joint work to refurbish a number of R-36M2

missiles.

In the summer of 2005 the service life of the R-36MUTTKh was extended until

2007–2009, after which time the remaining missiles will be decommissioned. The

decomissioning process is under way. In early 2005 the warheads were removed from

the missiles of the 59th Missile Division in Kartaly, Chelyabinsk region, and moved

to the storage facilities of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence

(MOD). The missiles were sent to Surovatikha, Nizhnii Novgorod region, for dis-

mantlement.

In October 2005 the disbandment of the division at Kartaly was

reported to have been completed.

At the beginning of 2006 the SRF had 126 SS-19 Stiletto (UR-100NUTTH)

missiles deployed at Kozelsk and Tatishchevo. The SS-19 is a silo-based, two-stage,

liquid-propellant ICBM, capable of carrying up to six warheads. The currently

deployed version of the missile entered service in 1980. On 20 October 2005 the SRF

Richardson, D., ‘Russia conducts further flight test of maneuvering warhead’, Jane’s Missiles &

Rockets, vol. 10, no. 1 (Jan. 2006), p. 11.

Safronov (note 15). On the Bulava SLBM see also the sub-section ‘Ballistic missile submarines’

below.

Dolinin, A., ‘Strazh bezopasnosti derzhavy’ [The state security guard], Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 Dec.

2005, URL <http://www.redstar.ru/2005/12/16_12/1_01.html>.

Dolinin (note 14).

Lennox, D. (ed.), Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Jane’s Information Group Limited: Coulsdon,

2005), pp. 127–28.

Poroskov (note 13).

‘Russian commander pins hopes on missile cooperation with Ukraine’, Interfax, 26 Dec. 2005.

Safronov (note 15).

ITAR-TASS, ‘Russia disbands strategic missile division, redeploys troops’, 19 Oct. 2005.

Page 10

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test-launched an SS-19 as part of a programme to extend the missile’s service life by

an additional 20 years. The dummy warhead successfully hit the target at the Kura

test range at Kamchatka peninsula.

Of the 150 test-launches of the SS-19 carried out

to date, only three are reported to have failed.

The Rokot satellite launch vehicle, a

derivative of the SS-19, has been launched seven times since 2000, of which six

launches were successful.

A launch failure occurred on 8 October 2005, when

Rokot failed to put a European satellite, Cryosat, into orbit.

The SRF deployed 270 SS-25 ‘Sickle’ ICBMs as of January 2006. The SS-25 is a

road-mobile, three-stage solid-propellant ICBM that carries a single warhead. The

missile was first deployed in 1985 and production ceased in 1994.

According to

Russian sources, 144 SS-25s are expected to be in service in 2010.

The missile’s

original 10-year service life has reportedly been extended to 19 years.

On 29

November the SRF successfully test-launched an SS-25 that had entered service in

1985. On the basis of the results of the test, the SRF stated that the service lives of

such missiles could be extended up to 23 years, in which case they may remain

operational until 2016–18.

Ballistic missile submarines

In 2005 the Russian Navy deployed 13 SSBNs with the Northern and Pacific fleets.

Of these, six were Delta III (Project 667BDR Kalmar) submarines.

Some experts

suggest that the submarines of this class, which first entered service in 1982, may be

retired during the next few years.

The Navy continues to operate seven Delta IV

Class (Project 667BDRM Delfin) submarines. One SSBN has been paid off and is

currently being refitted as a special-purpose submarine. The six remaining SSBNs—

Verkhotur’e, Yekaterinburg, Novomoskovsk, Tula, Bryansk and Kareliya—are based

in the Northern Fleet. As of January 2006, Bryansk and Kareliya were undergoing

service life-extension overhauls and refitting with newly produced SS-N-23 Skiff

‘Zapusk “Stileta” vnov’ podtverdil nadezhnost’ odnoy iz samykh sovershennykh MBR Rossii’

[The launch of ‘Stiletto’ has once again confirmed the reliability of the one of Russia’s most refined

ICBMs’], Izvestia, 20 Oct. 2005, URL <http://news.izvestia.ru/community/news99862>.

‘Russia to test launch ICBM on 20 Oct’, ITAR-TASS, 17 Oct. 2005.

‘Zapusk “Stileta”…’ (note 28).

‘Russia apologizes to ESA over the loss of Cryosat space probe’, Pravda, 10 Oct. 2005, URL

<http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16280_Cryosat.html >.

Lennox (note 23), p. 138.

Safronov (note 15).

‘S kosmodroma Plesetsk zapustili 20-letnyuyu raketu’ [20-year-old missile was launched from

Plesetsk cosmodrome], Strana.ru, 29 Nov. 2005, URL <http://www.strana.ru/news/266308.html>.

‘Topol missile life could be extended’, RIA Novosti, 29 Nov. 2005, URL <http://en.rian.ru/russia/

20051129/42252655.html >.

The Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, Svyatoi Georgii Pobedonosets, Zelenograd and Podol’sk are

deployed with the Pacific Fleet, and the Ryazan’ and Borisoglebsk are with the Northern Fleet. The Navy

uses a seventh non-operational Delta III as a test platform.

Norris, R. and Kristensen, H., ‘Russian nuclear forces, 2005’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

vol. 61, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2005), pp. 70–72, URL <http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=

ma05norris>; and Barabanov, M., ‘Perspektivy atomnogo podvodnogo sudostroeniya v XXI veke’

[Perspectives of nuclear submarines shipbuilding in XXI century], Yadernyi Kontrol’, vol. 10, no. 2

(summer 2004), pp. 133–54, URL <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yk2-2004.pdf>.

Page 11

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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missiles, which the others had recently completed.

The six Delta IVs may remain in

service until 2015–20.

In addition to these submarines, the Russian Navy operates one Typhoon Class

submarine, renamed the Dmitrii Donskoi following its overhaul and relaunching in

June 2002, as a test platform for new SS-NX-30 Bulava missile.

The sea trials of

Dmitrii Donskoi were successfully completed on 6 December 2004.

Russian mili-

tary officials indicated in 2005 that Dmitrii Donskoi and the two remaining Typhoon

Class submarines—Arkhangel’sk and Severstal’, which were laid up in 2004 for

financial reasons—are to be upgraded by replacing their obsolete SS-N-20 Sturgeon

SLBMs with the new SS-NX-30 Bulava.

Russia is building a new class of SSBN, the Project 955 Borei, which so far does

not have a NATO designation. Three submarines of this class are scheduled to be

commissioned by 2010, with three more to follow. The first ship in the class, Yurii

Dolgorukii, was laid down in November 1996 at the Severnoye Mashinostroitel’noye

Predpriyatiye (Sevmash) shipyard in Severodvinsk in northern Russia.

The commis-

sioning of this submarine was postponed several times because of financial problems

and the decision to arm it with the SS-NX-30 Bulava SLBM instead of the previously

planned SS-NX-28 Bark.

In November 2005, the Commander-in-Chief of the

Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, stated that Yurii Dolgorukii will be

commissioned in 2007.

The second ship in the class, Aleksandr Nevskii, was laid

down at Sevmash on 19 March 2004. The construction of the third ship, tentatively

named Vladimir Monomakh, is scheduled to begin in March 2006.

Each of these

submarines will be armed with 12 SS-NX-30 Bulava missiles.

Russia’s SLBM force consists of two types of missile. The SS-N-18 Stingray

missile (RSM-50), which first entered service in 1977, is deployed on Delta III Class

submarines. The SS-N-18 M1 has two liquid-fuelled stages and carries three war-

Norris and Kristensen (note 37); and Saunders, S. (ed.), Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006 (Jane’s

Information Group Limited: Coulsdon, UK, 2005), p. 602); and Bondarenko, A., and Emel’yanenkov,

A., ‘Prishla “Tula” s novym “samovarom”’ [‘Tula’ came with the new ‘samovar’], Rossiiskaya Gazeta,

12 Jan. 2006.

The Soviet Union built a total of six Typhoon Class (Project 941 Akula) SSBNs in 1976–89. Russia

decommissioned three of the Typhoons in 1996.

’APL “Dmitrii Donskoi” zavershila hodovye ispytaniya’ [SSBN ‘Dmitry Donskoy’ has finished sea

trials], ITAR-TASS, 6 Dec. 2004, URL <http://www.a-submarine.ru/news/main/viewPrintVersion?id=

10113&idChannel=418>.

Tul’ev, M., ‘V interesah triady’ [In the interest of the triad], Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’ier,

11 May 2005; ‘Russian defense minister on plans to equip new submarines with Bulava missiles’,

Agentstvo Voennykh Novostei, 28 Sep. 2005.

Plugatarev, I., ‘“Topol-M” vytesnyaet “Molodtsa” i “Voevodu”’[“Topol-M” replaces “Molodets”

and “Voevoda”], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 28 Jan. 2005, URL <http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/forces/

2005-01-28/1_topol.html>.

Kile and Kristensen (note 1), pp. 587–88; and Litovkin, V., ‘“Bulava” idet maketom’ [The model

of ‘Bulava’], Moskovskie Novosti, 15 Oct. 2004, URL <http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2004-39-16>.

Ustinov, E. and Fomishenko, R., ‘Novye kalibry “Astrakhani”’ [New calibers of “Astrakhan’”],

Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 Nov. 2005, URL <http://www.redstar.ru/2005/11/17_11/1_02.html>.

‘V Rossii postroyat novuyu submarinu’ [New submarine will be built in Russia], Kommersant,

25 Jan. 2006, URL <http://www.kommersant.ru/index-news-y.html?id=93941>.

Safronov, I., ‘“Alexandr Nevskii” strategicheskogo naznacheniya’ [‘Alexander Nevsky’ of

strategic purpose], Kommersant, 19 Mar. 2004.

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, 2005

Table 13A.3. Russian nuclear forces, January 2006

NATO

No.

Year first Range

Warheads

Type

designation

deployed

deployed (km)

x yield

Warheads

Strategic offensive forces

Bombers

Tu-95MS6

Bear-H6

1981

6 500– 6 x AS-15A ALCMs,

192

10 500

bombs

Tu-95MS16

Bear-H16

1981

6 500–

16 x AS-15A ALCMs,

512

10 500

bombs

Tu-160

Blackjack

1987

10 500– 12 x AS-15B ALCMs

168

13 200

or AS-16 SRAMs, bombs

Subtotal

872

ICBMs

SS-18

Satan

1979

11 000– 10 x 500–750 kt

740

15 000

SS-19

Stiletto

126

1980

10 000

6 x 500–750 kt

756

SS-25

Sickle

270

1985

10 500

1 x 550 kt

270

SS-27

(Topol-M)

1997

10 500

1 x 550 kt

Subtotal

512

1 808

SLBMs

SS-N-18 M1

Stingray

1978

6 500

3 x 200 kt (MIRV)

288

SS-N-23

Skiff

1986

9 000

4 x 100 kt (MIRV)

384

Subtotal

192

672

Total strategic offensive

782

3 352

forces

Strategic defensive forces

ABMs

SH-11/

Gorgon/

100

1989/1986

1 x 1000/10 kt

100

SH-08

Gazelle

SA-10

Grumble

1900

1980

1 x low kt

600

Non-strategic forces

Land-based non-strategic

Bombers

Tu-22M Backfire

116

1974

2 x AS-4 ASM, bombs

Su-24 Fencer

371

1974

2 x bombs

Subtotal

487

974

Naval non-strategic

Attack aircraft

Tu-22M Backfire

1974

2 x AS-4 ASM, bombs

Su-24 Fencer

1974

2 x bombs

Subtotal

116

232

SLCMs

SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21, SS-N-22

266

ASW and SAM weapons

SS-N-15/16, torpedoes, SA-N-3/6

158

Total defensive and non-strategic

2 330

Total

5 682

Page 13

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

US designations are used in this column for Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.

The SA-10 Grumble may have some capability against some ballistic missiles. Only a

third of 1900 deployed SA-10s are counted as nuclear.

Figure includes warheads for all the land-based and naval aircraft, respectively.

Sources: US Department of State, START I Treaty Memoranda of Understanding (MOU),

1990 through January 2006; US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center

(NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (NAIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,

August 2003), URL <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NAIC2003rev.pdf>); US Central Intel-

ligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, ‘Foreign missile developments and the

ballistic missile threat through 2015’ (unclassified summary), Dec. 2001, URL <http://www.

cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.pdf>; US Department of

Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Jan. 2001; US Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (FBIS), various issues; ‘Russia: General Nuclear Weapons Developments’, Nuclear

Threat Initiative/Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, URL <http://www.

nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/gendevs.htm>; Russianforces.org; International Institute

for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005 (Routledge: London, 2004); Cochran,

T. B. et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Harper & Row:

New York, N.Y., 1989); Proceedings, US Naval Institute, various issues; ‘NRDC Nuclear

Notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and Authors’ estimates.

heads.

Apart from commercial launches, in 2005 the Russian Navy conducted two

launches of this missile. On 30 September the Svyatoi Georgii Pobedonosets

launched an SS-N-18 from a submerged position in the Okhotsk Sea. All three

dummy warheads successfully hit the target at the Chizha test range in north-western

Russia. On 8 October an SS-N-18 was successfully launched in the Barents Sea from

the Borisoglebsk Delta III submarine.

This submarine had experienced a widely

reported launch failure during a strategic forces exercise in 2004 observed by Presi-

dent Putin.

The three-stage SS-N-23 Skiff (RSM-54) missile is a successor to the SS-N-18 and

was first test-launched in 1983. The current version of the missile, which carries four

warheads, is deployed on Delta IV SSBNs.

As reported in September 2005, the

missile underwent a modernization programme in 1996–2002, which included the

development of an improved warhead.

There were three successful test-launches of

modernized SS-N-23s from a Delta IV submarine, Yekaterinburg, in the Barents Sea

on 29 June 2004, 8 September 2004 and 17 August 2005. In all of the tests the war-

heads reportedly hit their targets at the Kura test range on the Kamchatka peninsula.

Lennox (note 23), p. 147.

Safronov, I., ‘“Svyatoi Georgii Pobedonosets” reabilitiroval “Volnu”’ [‘Svyatoi Georgii

Pobedonosets’ rehabilitated ‘Volna’], Kommersant, 1 Oct. 2005; and ‘Volna SLBM hits target in Kam-

chatka’, RIA Novosti, 8 Oct. 2005.

Lennox (note 23), p. 153; and US Department of State, START I Treaty Memorandum of Under-

standing (MOU), July 2005.

Kontareva, E., ‘Ofitsial’no. Gosudarstvo vysoko otsenilo vklad yuzhnoural’tsev v modernizatsiyu

odnogo iz luchshikh strategicheskikh kompleksov Voenno-Morskogo Flota Rossii’ [Officially. The state

highly appreciated the contribution of the people of South Urals to modernization of the one of the best

strategic missile complexes of the Russian Navy], Ural-Press-Inform News Agency, 23 Sep. 2005, URL

<http://uralpress.ru/show_article_print.php?id=82055>.

‘Ballistic missile successfully fired from a nuclear-powered submarine of the Russian Northern

Fleet’, ITAR-TASS, 29 June 2004; ‘Russian submarines launch ballistic missiles’, RIA Novosti, 8 Sep.

Page 14

652 NON

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, 2005

As noted above, Russia is developing a new three-stage, solid-propellant SLBM,

the SS-NX-30 Bulava (R-30). The missile reportedly will have a maximum range of

8300 km. Russia has declared that the Baluva will be counted under START I rules as

carrying six warheads.

The first tests of the Bulava—unpowered ‘pop-up’

launches—were conducted from the Dmitrii Donskoi Typhoon Class submarine in

December 2003 and September 2004.

In 2005 the Russian Navy conducted two

flight-tests of the Bulava. On 27 September the Dmitrii Donskoi launched a Bulava

from a submerged position in the White Sea.

The missile carried a single warhead

that hit a designated target at the Kura range in Kamchatka.

On 21 December the

Dmitrii Donskoi successfully launched another Bulava while the submarine was

moving under water. Following this, Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that

Bulava tests would continue in 2006 and the missile would be deployed by 2008.

Strategic aviation

Russian strategic aviation units form the 37th Air Army of the Supreme High Com-

mand (Strategic) of the Russian Air Force, which includes two heavy bomber divi-

sions of Tu-160 and Tu-95MS aircraft. The 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Division is

based in Engels, Saratov oblast, and the 326th Heavy Bomber Division is based in

Ukrainka, Khabarovsk kray. The 37th Air Army also includes four divisions of

Tu-22M3 Backfire C bombers.

The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in

November 2004 that it planned to have a total of 75 Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS

Bear bombers in service by 2010.

The composition of the Russian strategic bomber fleet did not change in 2005,

despite declared plans to deliver two Tu-160 Blackjack long-range bombers during

the year.

On 30 December 2005 the Air Force accepted delivery of the 15th Tu-160

bomber, which was returning to active service after modernization.

The aircraft will

be deployed by March 2006.

The other 14 deployed Tu-160 bombers will undergo

2004; and Gordeeva, E., ‘Dostizheniye tselei’ [Achievement of goals], Vremya Novostey, 18 Aug. 2005,

URL <http://www.vremya.ru/2005/150/4/132369.html>.

US Department of State, START I Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Jan. 2006.

‘First test launch of Bulava missile to be held late this year’, ITAR-TASS, 28 Mar. 2005.

‘Defense minister praises Bulava missile system tests’, RIA Novosti, 28 Sep. 2005, URL <http://

en.rian.ru/russia/20050928/41538033.html>.

‘Update: Strategic ballistic missile launched in White Sea—defense ministry’, RIA Novosti,

27 Sep. 2005, URL <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050927/41525719.html>.

‘Bulava missile launch successful—defense minister’, RIA Novosti, 21 Dec. 2005, URL <http://

en.rian.ru/russia/20051221/42609288.html>.

‘Strategic Aviation’, Russian Nuclear Forces Project, 2 Nov. 2005, URL <http://www.russian

forces.org/eng/aviation/>; and Khudoleev, V., ‘37-ya derzhit kurs’ [37th Army is following the course],

Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 Dec. 2005, URL <http://www.redstar.ru/2005/12/23_12/1_02.html>.

‘Mnogoletnie plany Minoborony’ [Long-term plans of the defence ministry], Kommersant, 18 Nov.

2004, p. 3.

Kristensen and Kile (note 1), pp. 586, 588.

Khudoleev (note 57).

‘Modernizirovannyi strategicheskii bombardirovshchik Tu-160 v kontse dekabrya byl prinyat na

vooruzheniye VVS RF’ [Modernized strategic bomber Tu-160 was added to the arsenal of the Russian

Air Force in the end of December], ARMS-TASS, 17 Jan. 2006, URL <http://armstass.su/?page=article

&aid=22369&cid=25>; and ‘Dva samoleta v tri goda’ [Two airplanes in three years], Izvestia, 17 Jan.

2006, URL <http://izvestia.ru/armia2/article3054737>.

Page 15

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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similar modernization in the future.

The 2006 State Defence Order allocates funds

to pay for one new Tu-160.

According to the Commander of the 37th Air Army,

Major General Igor Khvorov, this will be a modernized bomber with new weapon

systems and ‘radio-electronic equipment’. It is scheduled to enter active service by

the end of 2006.

In 2005 Russian strategic aviation units participated in a number of military

exercises. These included manoeuvres with eight countries of the Commonwealth of

Independent States in April, manoeuvres with China (‘Peace Mission 2005’) in

August and a live-fire exercise of Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, also in August.

In the

last exercise, four ALCMs were test-fired in the presence of President Putin and hit

their targets at the Pemboy firing range near Vorkuta, in northern Russia. The type of

the missiles that were fired was not disclosed, but they are believed to have been the

nuclear-capable AS-15B Kent-B and the Raduga Kh-555 long-range conventional

cruise missile.

Russia is planning to test-fire at least 10 ALCMs in 2006.

IV. British nuclear forces

The UK possesses an arsenal of about 185 warheads for use by a fleet of four Van-

guard Class Trident SSBNs. It leases a total of 58 Trident II (D-5) SLBMs, including

spares, from the US Navy. Under normal circumstances one British SSBN will be on

patrol, carrying up to 48 warheads on 16 D-5 missiles. The second and third SSBNs

can be put to sea fairly rapidly, with similar loadings, while the fourth would take

longer because of its cycle of extensive overhaul and maintenance. With the end of

the cold war, the SSBN on patrol is maintained at a level of reduced readiness with a

‘notice to fire’ measured in days, and its missiles are de-targeted. There are reports

that some patrol coordination takes place between the UK and France.

The first British Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard, entered service in 1994. In

December 2004 it emerged from the Devonport Naval Base after undergoing a three-

year Long Overhaul Period (Refuel). On 10 October 2005 Vanguard successfully

launched a D-5 SLBM in the final phase of its Demonstration and Shakedown Oper-

ations (DSAO).

The Ministry of Defence did not specify when the vessel would

resume operational patrols. In January 2005, HMS Victorious arrived at the Devon-

port Naval Base for a major refit, including a refuelling of its nuclear reactor. This

meant that for most of 2005 only two SSBNs in the fleet—Vigilant and Vengeance—

were available for operational deployment.

Pulin, G., ‘Nam otvoditsya osnovnaya rol’ v politike uprezhdeniya’ [We are assigned to play a

major role in the policy of pre-emption], Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’ier, 15 Feb. 2006, URL <http://

www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.122.articles.names_01>.

‘Fradkov distributes defense order’, Kommersant, 1 Dec. 2005, URL <http://www.kommersant.

com/doc.asp?idr=527&id=631438>.

‘CIS air defense practiced on Russia’s missile carriers’, Kommersant, 6 Apr. 2005, URL <http://

www.kommersant.com/doc.asp?id=560866>; ‘First China–Russia war games begin’, The Guardian,

18 Aug. 2005, URL <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,1551833,00.html>; and ‘Putin takes to

the skies “like in a dream”’, RIA Novosti, 17 Aug. 2005, URL <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050817/

41169637.html>.

‘President Putin flies a cruise-missile sortie’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, vol. 9, no. 10 (Oct. 2005),

p. 11.

Khudoleev (note 57).

‘Vanguard prepares to rejoin UK Royal Navy Trident fleet’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, vol. 9,

no. 12 (Dec. 2005), pp. 1–2.

Page 16

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, 2005

Table 13A.4. British nuclear forces, January 2006

No.

Year first

Range

Warheads

Type

Designation deployed

deployed

(km)

x yield

in stockpile

SLBMs

D-5

Trident II

1994

>7 400 1–3 x 100 kt

185

Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

Fewer than 200 warheads are operationally available, c. 144 to arm 48 missiles on 3 of

4 SSBNs. The operational stockpile may consist of 185 warheads. Only 1 boat is on patrol at

any time, with no more than 48 warheads.

Sources: British Ministry of Defence (MOD), Press releases and the MOD website, URL

<http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/index.htm>; British MOD, Strategic Defence Review (MOD:

London, July 1998); British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard); Ormond,

D., ‘Nuclear deterrence in a changing world: the view from a UK perspective’, RUSI Journal,

June 1996, pp. 15–22; Norris, R. S. et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5: British, French,

and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Westview: Boulder, Colo., 1994), p. 9; ‘NRDC Nuclear Note-

book’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and Authors’ estimate.

The four Vanguard Class SSBNs will operate for almost two decades before their

nominal retirement date. However, owing to the lengthy procurement process

required for complex weapon systems (15 years in the case of the Trident system),

Secretary of State for Defence John Reid told the House of Commons in July 2005

that ‘decisions on any replacement of the United Kingdom’s are likely to be neces-

sary in the lifetime of the current Parliament, which will of course last some years’.

Reid later told the Commons Defence Committee that the government intended to

retain ‘Britain’s minimum nuclear deterrent’ for an unspecified period, pointing out

that the UK ‘has always maintained that as long as some other nuclear state which is

a potential threat has nuclear weapons we will retain ours’.

Critics of the govern-

ment, including some Labour Party parliamentarians, alleged that the decision had

already been made to replace the Trident with a new generation of nuclear weapons—

at an estimated cost of up to £20 billion ($35 billion)—without a public debate on

whether the UK still needed a nuclear deterrent.

The Ministry of Defence has confirmed that it is considering a range of options for

replacing the Trident. These include options involving land- and air-based delivery

systems as well as submarines.

In July 2005 the MOD announced a new, three-year,

Reid, J., Secretary of State for Defence, Oral answers, 4 July 2005, House of Commons, Hansard

C5, URL <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm050704/debtext/50704-02.

htm#50704-02_sbhd0>.

Reid, J., Secretary of State for Defence, Oral evidence before the Select Committee on Defence,

1 Nov. 2005; as reproduced in House of Commons Paper 556-i (Session 2005-06), 17 Jan. 2006, URL

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/556/5110101.htm>.

McSmith, A., ‘Revealed: Blair’s nuclear bombshell’, The Independent (Internet edn), 18 Oct. 2005,

URL <http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article320124.ece>; and ‘Labour MPs debate Trident

scheme’, BBC News Online, 31 Oct. 2005, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/4392050.stm>.

Kirkup, J., ‘UK nuclear defence up in the air’, The Scotsman (Internet edn), 29 Oct. 2005, URL

<http://news.scotsman.com/uk.cfm?id=2164822005>. For an overview of the options for a future nuclear

deterrent see Willet, L., ‘Questions for the debate on the future of the UK strategic deterrent’, RUSI

Journal, vol. 150, no. 6 (Dec. 2005), pp. 50–57.

Page 17

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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£1.05 billion (€1.5 billion) investment to upgrade the Trident missile warhead

facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston and Burgh-

field. The purpose of the investment is to ensure that the ‘existing Trident warhead

stockpile is reliable and safe’ and can be ‘maintained throughout its intended in-

service life’.

MOD officials have denied reports that the facilities might be used to

develop new nuclear weapons.

V. French nuclear forces

France continues to modernize and upgrade its nuclear forces. It maintains an opera-

tional arsenal of an estimated 348 nuclear warheads for delivery by SLBMs, carrier-

based strike aircraft and land-based aircraft. In 2005 France allocated approximately

€3 billion, or 7 per cent of its overall defence budget, to the nuclear forces.

The backbone of France’s nuclear deterrent is the Force Océanique Stratégique,

which consists of a fleet of four operational SSBNs of two classes: three of the new

Triomphant Class SSBNs; and one L’Inflexible Class (formerly Redoubtable Class)

SSBN. The remaining L’Inflexible Class SSBN will be retired when the fourth and

final vessel of the Triomphant Class, Le Terrible, enters service in 2010. The French

Navy’s four operational SSBNs are each armed with 16 Aérospatiale M45 missiles

carrying up to 6 TN-75 warheads. In 2010–15, beginning with the Le Terrible, three

Triomphant Class SSBNs will be retrofitted with the M51.1 SLBM. The new missile

will have a payload of six warheads and a maximum range of 8000 km.

Its

increased range compared to the M45 will permit French SSBNs to significantly

expand their patrol zones. The French Navy plans to take delivery of the improved

M51.2 missile, armed with the new Tête Nucléaire Océanique (TNO) warhead, from

2015.

The air component of the French nuclear force consist of two types of aircraft:

approximately 60 Mirage 2000Ns, which equip the three Air Force squadrons cur-

rently with nuclear strike roles; and about 24 Super Étendard aircraft deployed on the

aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. Both types of aircraft carry the Air-Sol Moyenne

Portée (ASMP) cruise missile. It is estimated that France has about 60 operational

ASMPs, but additional missiles may be in inactive storage. A new follow-on cruise

missile, designated the ASMP-A, is under development and will replace the ASMP

on Mirage 2000N aircraft in 2007. Beginning in 2008, the missile will also be inte-

grated with an unspecified number of Rafale aircraft in the Air Force and the Navy.

There has been a gradual evolution in France’s nuclear doctrine since the end of the

cold war. Although French officials continue to reject a no-first-use posture, they

have emphasized the need for greater flexibility in meeting a widening range of

plausible deterrence scenarios. Several reports in 2003 suggested that President

Jacques Chirac had approved changes in the country’s nuclear doctrine, similar to

those in the USA, to permit the targeting of ‘rogue states’ armed with nuclear, biolog-

Reid, J., Secretary of State for Defence, Oral answers, 19 July 2005, House of Commons, Hansard

C60WS, URL <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm050719/wmstext/507

19m03.htm>.

‘France’s nuclear-powered Le Vigilant prepares for patrol’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, vol. 9, no. 2

(Feb. 2005), p. 5.

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Table 13A.5. French nuclear forces, January 2006

No.

Year first Range

Warheads

Type

deployed deployed (km)

x yield

in stockpile

Land-based aircraft

Mirage 2000N

1988

2 750

1 x 300 kt ASMP

Carrier-based aircraft

Super Étendard

1978

650

1 x 300 kt ASMP

SLBMs

M45

1996

6 000

6 x 100 kt

288

Total

348

Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

The fourth and final Triomphant Class SSBN, Le Terrible, will replace L’Inflexible, in

2010 with the M51 SLBM.

The range of M45 is listed as only 4000 km in a 2001 report from the National Defence

Commission of the National Assembly.

Sources: French National Assembly, ‘Bill of Law for the 2003–2008 Military Programme’,

2002; French Ministry of Defence, ‘Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation’, Arms

Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: French Policy (La Documentation française:

Paris, 2000), chapter 3, pp. 36–56; Norris, R. S. et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 5:

British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Westview: Boulder, Colo., 1994), p. 10; Air

Actualités, various issues; Aviation Week & Space Technology, various issues; ‘NRDC

Nuclear Notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and Authors’ estimates.

ical or chemical weapons and which threatened France’s vital interests.

However,

Chirac denied at the time that that there had been any changes in nuclear doctrine.

On 19 January 2006 Chirac delivered a speech at L’Ile-Longue nuclear submarine

base setting out a new rationale for France’s force de frappe (nuclear deterrent

force).

In the speech Chirac cited the dangers of regional instability, growing

extremism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and said that the

country’s nuclear deterrent remained the fundamental guarantor of its security. He

threatened to retaliate with nuclear weapons against any state found to be supporting

terrorism against France or considering the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Chirac revealed that French nuclear forces had already been reconfigured to enable

them to destroy the ‘power centres’ of any state which sponsored a terrorist attack

against France.

This involved inter alia reducing the number of nuclear warheads of

SLBMs to allow more precisely targeted strikes. He did not say whether France was

prepared to resort to pre-emptive nuclear strikes against a country it saw as a threat.

The doctrinal change announced by Chirac was similar to one already undertaken

by the UK. In 2002, an addendum to the UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR)

Tertrais, B., ‘Nuclear policy: France stands alone’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 60, no. 4

(July/Aug. 2004), pp. 48–55.

‘Speech by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, during his visit to the Strategic Air

and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau/L’Ile Longue’, 19 Jan. 2006, URL <http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/

elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2006/speech_by_jacques_chirac_president_of_the_french_re

public_during_his_visit_to_the_stategic_forces.38447.html>.

‘Speech by Jacques Chirac’ (note 75).

Page 19

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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extended the role of nuclear weapons to include deterring ‘leaders of states of concern

and terrorist organizations’.

VI. Chinese nuclear forces

In July 2005, the annual report of the US Department of Defense on Chinese military

power included an overview of the composition of China’s ballistic missile force.

This overview and other recent information—most significantly a declaration by the

Chinese Foreign Ministry in 2004 that ‘China . . . possesses the smallest nuclear

arsenal of all the nuclear weapon states

—necessitates a reduction in the estimate of

the size of China’s nuclear forces. It is estimated here that China deploys approxi-

mately 130 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based missiles, sea-based missiles

and bombers.

Additional warheads are thought to be in storage.

Notwithstanding the change in the estimate for China’s nuclear forces, the size of

the Chinese warhead stockpile is thought not to have changed significantly for many

years. However, the delivery systems for those warheads have changed, with the

gradual withdrawal of the old DF-3A (CSS-2) and conversion of some of the newer

DF-21s to conventional missions. Moreover, according to US Government assess-

ments, China will soon begin replacing its small force of medium- and intermediate-

range ballistic missiles with newer, more survivable, long-range missiles.

This

includes the DF-31 (Dong Feng, or East Wind), a new solid-propellant, road-mobile

ICBM that the US DOD for a number of years has predicted was about to enter

service but which the 2005 report stated is still in development. Two modifications of

the DF-31, the longer-range DF-31A and the submarine-based Julang-2, are also

under development. The deployment of these longer-range, mobile systems is

expected to enhance the survivability of the Chinese missile force by enabling the

weapons to operate over a larger area. While the DOD is concerned that the new

missiles will increase the number of warheads that can reach the USA, the Chinese

Government insists that the development is consistent with China’s long-standing

commitment to a policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons.

The July 2005 DOD report predicted that the future Chinese land-based missile

force will eventually consist of modernized, silo-based DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) and

road-moble DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs. In addition, China will maintain a number of

nuclear-armed DF-21A MRBMs ‘for regional contingencies’.

The US intelligence

British Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, CM 5566, vol. 1, July

2002, p. 12, URL <http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/SDR_New_Chapter.pdf>.

US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s

Republic of China 2005, 19 July 2005, URL <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719

china.pdf>, p. 45.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Fact Sheet: China: nuclear dis-

armament and reduction of [sic]’, Beijing, 27 Apr. 2004, p. 1, URL <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/

zzjg/jks/cjjk/2622/t93539.htm>.

Some analysts have argued that only the land-based missile force is operationally deployed, in

which case China’s operational nuclear arsenal would be as low as c. 80 warheads. Lewis, J., ‘The

ambiguous arsenal’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no. 3 (May/June 2005), pp. 52–59.

US Department of Defense (note 78).

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s endeavors for

arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation’, Beijing, Sep. 2005, URL <http://www.china.com.

cn/english/features/book/140320.htm>.

US Department of Defense (note 78), p. 28.

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Table 13A.6. Chinese nuclear forces, January 2006

US or NATO No.

Year first Range

Warheads

Type

designation

deployed deployed (km)

x yield

in stockpile

Land-based missiles

DF-3A

CSS-2

1971

3 100

1 x 3.3 Mt

DF-4

CSS-3

1980

>5 500

1 x 3.3 Mt

DF-5A

CSS-4

1981

13 000

1 x 4–5 Mt

DF-21A

CSS-5

1991

2 100

1 x 200–300 kt

DF-31

CSS-X-10

(2006)8 000

1 x ?

DF-31A

(2007–09)12 000

1 x ?

SLBM s

Julang 1

CSS-NX-3

1986

>1 000

1 x 200–300 kt

Julang 2

(2008–10)8 000

1 x ?

Aircraft

Hong-6

B-6

1965

3 100

1 x bomb20

Attack

(Qian-5,

1972–?

1 x bomb20

Others?)

Strategic weapons130

Non-strategic weapons

Short-range ballistic missiles (DF-15 and DF-11)

Total130

Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

China defines missile ranges as: short-range, <1000 km; medium-range, 1000–3000 km;

long-range, 3000–8000 km; and intercontinental range, >8000 km. The range of the DF-3A

and the DF-21A may be longer than is normally reported.

The JL-1 has never been fully operational and the single Xia Class SSBN has never

conducted a deterrent patrol.

A small stockpile of bombs with yields between 10 kt and 3 Mt is thought to exist for

delivery by aircraft. Chinese aircraft are not believed to have nuclear weapons delivery as a

primary role but as a contingency mission. Figures for aircraft are for nuclear-configured

versions only. The table assumes no more than 40 bombs for aircraft.

The existence of tactical warheads is highly uncertain, but several low-yield nuclear tests

in 1970s and US Government statements in the 1980s and 1990s suggest that some tactical

warheads may have been developed.

Additional warheads may be in storage.

Sources: US Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Military

Power of the People’s Republic of China,’ July 2005; US Air Force, National Air and Space

Intelligence Center (NASIC), various documents; US Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Foreign

Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015’ (unclassified sum-

mary), Dec. 2001, URL <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballistic

missilefinal.pdf>; US DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Proliferation: threat and

response’, Washington, DC, Jan. 2001, URL <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.

pdf>; Norris, R. S. et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 5: British, French, and Chinese

Nuclear Weapons (Westview: Boulder, Colo., 1994); ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook’, Bulletin of

the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and Authors’ estimates.

Page 21

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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community has stated that China might deploy multiple warheads on its DF-5A

(CSS-4) missiles to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrent against missile defence

systems, but neither the DF-31 nor its two modifications are thought to be designed to

carry multiple warheads.

China has had great difficulty in developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent. The

single Type 092 (Xia Class) SSBN, armed with the JL-1 SLBM, is not believed to

have achieved full operational capability and, according to US Naval Intelligence, has

never conducted a deterrent patrol. A new SSBN, the Type 094, is under construction.

Press reports that the submarine had been launched in July 2004 appear to have been

premature;

the submarine was probably the first unit of the Type 093, a replacement

for the Han Class nuclear-powered attack submarine. The Type 094 is not expected to

enter into service before the end of this decade at the earliest.

The missile intended for the Type 094 Class SSBN, a modified DF-31 known as

the Julang-2 (JL-2), was successfully test-launched on 16 June 2005 from a

submerged submarine in the Pacific Ocean near the Shandong Peninsula.

The

submarine is believed to have been a modified Golf Class submarine. A previous test

in mid-2004 failed. The DOD estimates that JL-2 will have an intercontinental range

of about 7500–8000 km and that it will carry a single warhead.

It is thought that China has a small stockpile of nuclear bombs for delivery by air-

craft. Between 1965 and 1976, Chinese Hong-5, Hong-6 and Qian-5 aircraft dropped

a total of 11 nuclear bombs in nuclear tests at the Lop Nur Test Site. The bombs det-

onated with yields of 8–4000 kt in four distinct ranges. The US Defense Intelligence

Agency estimated in 1984 that ‘a small number of the nuclear-capable aircraft prob-

ably have nuclear bombs, even though we are unable to identify airfield storage

sites’,

and in 1993 the National Security Council told Congress that China has a

‘small stockpile of nuclear bombs’. Although the Chinese Air Force was not believed

to have units whose primary purpose was to deliver the bombs, the NSC estimated

that ‘some units may be tasked for nuclear delivery as a contingency mission’.

The

candidates for nuclear contingency missions today include the H-6 bomber, and per-

haps also a fighter-bomber. China is also developing land-attack cruise missiles that

may be for delivery by the H-6. The 2005 DOD report states that, once developed,

there ‘are no technological bars to placing on these systems a nuclear payload’.

A multiple re-entry vehicle system releases 2 or more RVs along the missile’s linear flight path to a

single target, which land in a relatively confined area at about the same time. The more sophisticated and

flexible MIRV system can manoeuvre multiple RVs to several different release points to provide tar-

geting flexibility against several independent targets over a much wider area and longer period of time.

See, e.g., Gertz, B., ‘China tests ballistic missile submarine’, Washington Times (Internet edn),

3 Dec. 2004, URL <http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041202-115302-

2338r>.

‘China test-fires new submarine-launched missile’, Daily Yomiuri (Internet edn), 18 June 2005,

URL <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20050618wo42.htm>; and ‘China test fires long-range missile

from submarine’, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, vol. 9, no. 8 (Aug. 2005), p. 4.

Norris, R. and Kristensen, H., ‘Chinese nuclear forces 2003’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

vol. 59, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2003), URL <http://www.thebulletin.org/print.php?art_ofn=nd03norris>,

pp. 77–80,

US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Nuclear weapons systems in China’, DEB-49-84, 24 Apr. 1984,

pp. 3–4, partially declassified and released under the US Freedom of Information Act.

US National Security Council, ‘Report to Congress on status of China, India and Pakistan nuclear

and ballistic missile programs’, n.d. [28 July 1993], p. 2, obtained under the US Freedom of Information

Act by the Federation of American Scientists.

US Department of Defense (note 78), p. 29.

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VI. Indian nuclear forces

India is widely believed to be expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal, although little

public information is available about the pace and scale of such an expansion. The

conservative estimate presented here is that India possesses about 50 nuclear

weapons. The figure is based on India’s estimated inventory of 360–530 kg of

military plutonium

and assessments made by the US intelligence community. The

US Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in July 1999 that India possessed

10–15 nuclear weapons.

There is considerable uncertainty in published estimates of the total amount of

weapon-grade plutonium that India has produced and, hence, in estimates of the num-

ber of nuclear weapons that it could have built. A number of factors contribute to this.

First, there are different assessments of the lifetime operating capacity (i.e., of the

reliability and efficiency) of the 100-megawatt-thermal (MW(t)) Dhruva reactor and

the ageing 40-MW(t) CIRUS reactor, which are dedicated to producing plutonium for

military use.

Second, it is unclear whether India has used all of its available

weapon-grade plutonium to build nuclear weapons, as some analysts have assumed.

Finally, there are different views on how to take into account the losses and draw-

downs of nuclear material that occur during production, processing and testing.

In addition to these factors, there continues to be a debate about whether non-

weapon-grade plutonium (either in the form of reactor-grade plutonium or a mix of

isotopes closer to weapon-grade plutonium) was used in one of the nuclear explosive

tests carried out by India in May 1998.

If the test gave confidence that this material

could be used for weapons, India may see the large quantity of plutonium contained

in the spent fuel of its unsafeguarded power reactors as being a potential part of its

military nuclear programme.

India may be working to increase its capability for producing weapon-grade pluto-

nium.

Some critics of the July 2005 Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative (CNCI)

between India and the United States have argued that, by allowing the sale of nuclear

fuel for use in designated Indian civilian installations, the deal would free up India’s

limited domestic uranium supplies for military purposes.

Critics of the deal have

also expressed concern about the unwillingness of India’s Department of Atomic

Energy to place its fast breeder reactor (FBR) programme under International Atomic

Albright, D., ‘India’s military plutonium inventory, end of 2004’, 7 May 2005, Institute for Science

and International Security (ISIS), Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials, URL <http://www.isis-

online.org/global_stocks/end2003/India:_military_plutonium.pdf>. The estimate of 50 warheads

assumes that each warhead would require 5 kg of plutonium and that only 250 kg of the military plu-

tonium produced by India has so far been used in assembled nuclear warheads.

US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘A Primer on the Future Threat: The Decades Ahead: 1999–

2020’, July 1999, p. 38, reproduced in Scarborough, R., Rumsfeld’s War (Regnery: Washington, DC,

2004), pp. 194–223.

According to the World Nuclear Association, in the 1990s India’s nuclear power reactors had some

of the world’s lowest operating capacity factors. World Nuclear Association, ‘India and Pakistan’,

Information and Issues Brief, Nov. 2002, URL <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.htm>.

Perkovich, G., India’s Nuclear Bomb: the Impact on Global Proliferation (University of California

Press: Berkeley, Calif., 1999), pp. 428–31.

Albright (note 91).

Mian, Z. and Ramana, M., ‘Feeding the nuclear fire’, Economic and Political Weekly (Mumbai),

27 Aug. 2005, URL <http://www.geocities.com/m_v_ramana/nucleararticles/indo-us-deal.html>. For

further detail on the Indo-US CNCI see appendix 13B in this volume.

Page 23

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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Energy Agency safeguards, thereby raising doubt that the programme is for

exclusively peaceful purposes.

It is not publicly known whether India has produced highly enriched uranium

(HEU) for weapon purposes. India operates two gas centrifuge facilities: a pilot scale

plant at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) complex and a larger plant that

has been reportedly operating since 1990 at Rattehalli, Karnataka. The primary pur-

pose of the latter facility appears to be to produce HEU for an indigenous nuclear-

powered submarine under development.

India’s nuclear doctrine, which was published as a draft document in 1999, is

‘based on the principle of a minimum credible deterrent and no-first-use’.

Addi-

tional guidelines, published in January 2003, state that India would use nuclear

weapons to deter or retaliate against the use of chemical or biological weapons.

There have been no official statements specifying the size of the nuclear stockpile

required for ‘credible minimum deterrence’. However, according to the Indian MOD

it involves ‘a mix of land-based, maritime and air capabilities’.

100

Most observers

believe that India maintains a recessed nuclear posture, in accordance with its no-

first-use policy: that is, nuclear warheads are not mated to their delivery vehicles, and

some nuclear warheads may be stored in unassembled form, with the plutonium core

kept separately from the non-nuclear ignition components.

Strike aircraft

Aircraft currently constitute the core of India’s nuclear strike capabilities. The Indian

Air Force (IAF) has reportedly certified the Mirage 2000H Vajra (‘Divine Thunder’)

combat aircraft for delivery of nuclear gravity bombs. The IAF deploys two squad-

rons of Mirage 2000H aircraft at the Gwalior Air Force Station in north-central India.

In August 2005 India and Qatar suspended negotiations over India’s purchase of

12 ex-Qatari Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, which could have augmented the IAF’s nuclear

strike capability. Some of the IAF’s four squadrons of Jaguar IS Shamsher (‘Sword’)

combat aircraft may have a nuclear delivery role.

101

Other aircraft that are potentially

suitable for a nuclear role are the MiG-27 and the Su-30MKI.

Land-based ballistic missiles

The Prithvi (‘Earth’) was India’s sole operational ballistic missile for many years and

the first believed to have a nuclear capability. The Prithvi I (SS-150) is a single-stage,

road-mobile ballistic missile capable of delivering a 1000-kg warhead to a maximum

Albright, D. and Basu, S., ‘Separating India’s military and civilian nuclear facilities’, Institute for

Science and International Security (ISIS), ISIS Report, 16 Dec. 2005, URL <http://www.isis-

online.org/publications/southasia/indiannuclearfacilities.pdf>; and ‘Atomic Lethargy’, Indian Express

(Internet edn), 23 Jan. 2006, URL <http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php? content_id=86424>.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian

Nuclear Doctrine, 17 Aug. 1999, URL <http://meaindia.nic.in//disarmament/dm17Aug99.htm>.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Cabinet Committee on Security reviews operationalization of

India’s nuclear doctrine’, Press release, 4 Jan. 2003, URL <http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/

2003/01/04pr01.htm>.

100

Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2004–05, URL <http://mod.nic.in/reports/report

05.htm>, p. 14.

101

Norris, R. and Kristensen, H., ‘India’s nuclear forces’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61,

no. 5 (Sep./ Oct. 2005), pp. 73–75.

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, 2005

range of 150 km. The missile was first test flown in 1988 and entered into service

with the Indian Army in 1994. It is currently deployed with the Army’s 333, 444 and

555 Missile Groups. On 19 March and 12 May 2005, India conducted test-launches of

Prithvi I missiles at its Integrated Test Range at Chandipur-on-Sea, in the Bay of Ben-

gal, off the coast of the eastern state of Orissa. A number of Prithvi I missiles are

widely believed to have been modified to deliver nuclear warheads, although this has

never been officially confirmed.

There are two newer versions of the Prithvi missile featuring improved range, accu-

racy and handling characteristics. The Prithvi II (SS-250), which has entered into

Table 13A.7. Indian nuclear forces, January 2006

Range

Payload

Type

(km)

(kg)

Status

Ballistic missiles

Prithvi I (P-I)

150

800

Entered service in 1994, widely believed to

have a nuclear delivery role. Most recent

flight-tests on 19 Mar. and 12 Dec. 2005

Agni I

800

1 000

Inducted into Indian Army service in 2004

Agni II

2 000–2 500

1 000

Inducted into Indian Army service in 2004

Aircraft

Mirage 2000H Vajra

1 850

6 300

Aircraft has reportedly been certified for

delivery of nuclear gravity bomb

Jaguar IS Shamsher

1 400

4 760

Some of 4 squadrons may have nuclear

delivery role

Missile payloads may have to be reduced in order to achieve maximum range. Aircraft

range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight pro-

file and weapon loading.

The original Agni I, now known as the Agni, was a technology demonstrator programme

that ended in 1996.

An upgraded version (Agni III) currently under development may have a range of

3500 km, possibly with a reduced payload.

Other aircraft in the Indian Air Force’s inventory which are potentially suitable for a

nuclear role are the MiG-27 (Bahadur) and the Su-30MKI. The Su-30MKI has an in-flight

refuelling capability with the IL-78 aerial tanker.

Sources: Indian Ministry of Defence, annual reports and press releases; International Institute

for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2004–2005 (IISS: London, 2004); US Air

Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile

Threat (NAIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003), URL <http://www.

nukestrat.com/us/afn/NAIC2003rev.pdf>; US Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Unclassified

report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction

and advanced conventional munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002’, Apr. 2003, URL

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_apr_2003.htm>; US National Intelligence

Council, ‘Foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threat through 2015’

(unclassified

summary),

Dec.

2001,

URL

<http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_

products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.pdf>; Lennox, D. (ed.), Jane’s Strategic Weapon

Systems (Jane’s Information Group, Ltd: Coulsdon, 2004); Bharat Rakshak, Consortium of

Indian military websites URL <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com>; Vivek Raghuvanshi,

Defense News, various articles; and Authors’ estimates.

Page 25

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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service with the Indian Air Force, can carry a 500- to 700-kg warhead to a maximum

range of 250 km. It is not believed to have a nuclear role. The Prithvi III (SS-350),

which is in development, is a two-stage, solid-fuel missile designed to deliver a

1000-kg warhead to a range of up to 350 km. Its most recent flight-tests took place in

January and October 2004.

Indian defence sources indicate that the family of longer-range Agni (‘Fire’) ballis-

tic missiles, which are designed to provide a short-reaction-time nuclear capability,

has largely taken over the Prithvi’s nuclear delivery role.

102

The original Agni missile

was a technology demonstrator that was test flown several times between 1989 and

1994, up to a range of 1500 km, but never operationally deployed. The short-range

Agni I is a single-stage, solid-fuel missile that can deliver a 1000-kg warhead to a

maximum range of 700–800 km. The two-stage Agni II can deliver a similar payload

to a range of up to 2500 km. The missiles are road and rail mobile, and both can carry

nuclear as well as conventional warheads. Following several successful flight-tests in

2004, the Agni I and Agni II were inducted into service with the Indian Army’s 334

and 335 Missile Groups, respectively. In May 2005, the missiles were incorporated

into India’s tri-service Strategic Forces Command. The Defence Research & Devel-

opment Organization (DRDO) is reportedly planning to upgrade the Agni II’s engines

and to install decoys along with the warhead to counter defensive systems.

103

The DRDO is developing a longer-range Agni III intermediate-range ballistic

missile with a maximum range of 3500 km. The Agni III continues to experience

engineering and systems integration problems, and its maiden flight-test scheduled

for 2003 was again postponed in 2005.

104

Indian media reports indicate that because

of the ongoing technical problems, the DRDO has decided to increase the range of the

Agni II missile, initially by 300 km, as an interim measure.

105

In 2005 the Indian press reported that the MOD wanted to move beyond the

Agni III and proceed with development of an ICBM. The proposed missile reportedly

will be a three-stage design, with the first two stages using solid propellant and the

third stage using liquid propellant, and will have a range of 9000–12 000 km. It may

carry two or three nuclear warheads with yields of 15–20 kt.

106

It is not expected to

enter service until after 2015. Western analysts have speculated for some time that

India was developing an ICBM, known as the Surya, based on an indigenous space-

launch vehicle.

107

India continues to develop the naval leg of its planned ‘triad’ of nuclear forces. The

Indian Navy is acquiring a rudimentary nuclear capability with the Dhanush (‘Bow’)

ship-based launcher system. The system uses a modified version of the Prithvi II

102

‘Prithvi SRBM’, Bharat Rakshak: consortium of Indian military websites, updated 15 Apr. 2005,

URL <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Prithvi.html>.

103

‘DRDO plans to add decoys to Agni IRBM’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, vol. 9, no. 12 (Dec.

2005), p. 4.

104

Pandit, R., ‘Glitches delaying Agni III test’, Times of India (Internet edn), 3 Mar. 2005, URL

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1038860.cms>; and ‘Agni III to be test fired by end of

year’, Hindu (Internet edn), 30 Mar. 2005, URL <http://www.thehindu.com/2005/03/30/stories/2005

033011851200.htm>.

105

Dikshit, S., ‘Step-up of Agni-II range planned’, The Hindu (Internet edn), 13 Feb. 2005, URL

<http://www.hindu.com/2005/02/13/stories/2005021303540900.htm>.

106

Madhuprasad, ‘India to “soon” develop intercontinental ballistic missile’, Deccan Herald (Internet

edn), 25 Aug. 2005, URL <http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/aug252005/index2032552005

824.asp>.

107

‘Indian press reports potential for ICBM development’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, vol. 9, no. 10

(Oct. 2005), pp. 10–11.

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missile, which the MOD has stated will be capable carrying both conventional and

nuclear warheads.

108

The DRDO successfully test-fired two missiles using the

Dhanush launcher system mounted on a surface ship, INS Rajput, off the coast of

Orissa on 16 April and 28 December 2005.

India appears to be developing a more advanced sea-based nuclear strike capability

in the form of the Sagarika (‘Oceanic’) SLBM, which has sometimes been reported as

being an sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).

109

According to the US Defense Intelli-

gence Agency, India flight-tested an SLBM for the first time in the spring of 2005.

110

Some press reports suggest that India may intend to deploy nuclear-armed missiles on

the Advanced Technology Vessel, a much-delayed nuclear-powered submarine pro-

ject that began in 1983.

111

VII. Pakistani nuclear forces

The estimate presented here—that Pakistan possesses approximately 60 nuclear

weapons—is a conservative one, based on the size of Pakistan’s estimated military

inventory of fissile material

112

and on assessments made by the US intelligence com-

munity. The US Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in July 1999 that Pakistan

had up to 25 nuclear weapons.

113

Pakistan is believed to be working to increase and diversify its nuclear forces,

which are under the control of a National Command Authority that was established

by the military government in 2000. In March 2005 President Pervez Musharraf

pledged to upgrade the country’s nuclear capability, which he said ‘was here to stay’

and would ‘continue to receive the highest national priority’.

114

Pakistani officials

have stated that the country ‘subscribes to the principle of minimum credible deter-

rence and opposes nuclear proliferation and an arms race in the region’.

115

However,

because of Pakistan’s fears of being overrun by India’s larger conventional forces in a

military conflict, Pakistan has consistently rejected a no-first-use nuclear policy.

108

Indian Ministry of Defence, ‘Dhanush successfully test fired’, Press release, New Delhi, 8 Nov.

2004, URL <http://mod.nic.in/pressreleases/content.asp?id=853>.

109

Norris and Kristensen (note 101).

110

Maples, M. D., Lieutenant General, US Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Current

and projected national security threats to the United States’, Statement for the Record to the Senate

Armed Services Committee, 28 Feb. 2006, URL <http://www.senate.gov/armed_services/statemnt/

2006/February/Maples%2002-28-06.pdf>, p. 11.

111

Pandit, R., ‘Nuclear sub project gathers steam’, Times of India (Internet edn), 20 July 2005, URL

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1178241,prtpage-1.cms>.

112

It is assumed that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are of solid core, implosion-type designs requiring

15–20 kg of HEU each, but it is likely that Pakistan has used only part of its inventory of military fissile

material in assembled warheads. At the end of 2003 Pakistan’s inventory of HEU for military pro-

grammes was estimated to be c. 1000–1250 kg. Albright, D., ‘ISIS estimates of unirradiated fissile

material produced in de facto nuclear weapon states, produced in nuclear weapon programs’, revised

30 June 2005, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive

Material, URL <http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/de_facto_nws.pdf >.

113

US Defense Intelligence Agency (note 92).

114

Gilani, M., ‘Pakistan vows to strengthen nuclear program’, Agence France-Presse, 21 Mar. 2005,

URL <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=735622&C=asiapac&P=true>.

115

Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan, quoted in ‘PM warns of arms race in South Asia’,

Dawn (Internet edn), 25 Jan. 2006, URL <http://www.dawn.com/2006/01/25/top3.htm>.

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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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Ballistic missiles

Pakistan will most likely remain dependent on external suppliers for its medium-

range ballistic missile programmes in the short and medium terms.

116

The National

Defence Complex (NDC), a subsidiary body of the National Engineering and Scien-

tific Commission, and the Kahuta Research Laboratories have vigourous research and

development and procurement programmes under way for MRBMs, based on

imported missiles and production technology. Pakistan has received considerable

technical assistance from China and North Korea in the past. Former Prime Minister

Benazir Bhutto acknowledged in July 2004 that Pakistan had purchased missile tech-

nology from North Korea but denied that it aided the latter with nuclear tech-

nology.

117

Pakistan has deployed three families of ballistic missiles that may have a nuclear

delivery role, and it continues to develop more advanced versions. The Ghaznavi

(Hatf-3) ballistic missile was formally inducted into service with the Pakistani Army

in 2004. It can deliver a 500-kg payload to a maximum range of 290 km. Its single-

stage, solid-propellant design, which can be transported by road on a modified

Scud-B wheeled transporter–erector–launcher (TEL), is believed to be a domestically

produced copy of the Chinese M-11 missile.

The Shaheen I (Hatf-4), which has been declared to be nuclear-capable, entered

into service with the Pakistani Army in 2003. Analysts remain divided over whether

the single-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen I is a version of the Chinese M-9 missile or an

improved Chinese M-11 missile. It uses the same wheeled TEL as the Ghaznavi and

has a range of 600–800 km, depending on the payload. The two-stage Shaheen II

(Hatf-6) is believed to use the Shaheen I missile as its second stage and may be able

to carry multiple warheads. Its reported range of 2000–3000 km means that it can

reach targets across India. On 19 March 2005 Pakistan announced that it had suc-

cessfully test-fired a Shaheen II ballistic missile. Pakistan said that it had given India

prior notice of the test, in accordance with the informal practice that they agreed in

1999. Development flight-tests are expected to continue in 2006.

Pakistani defence officials have stated that the medium-range Ghauri missiles have

a nuclear delivery role. The 1500 km-range Ghauri I (Hatf-5) missile and a longer-

range variant, the Ghauri II, are based on North Korea’s No-dong 1/2 missile technol-

ogy and reportedly have been developed with extensive design and engineering

assistance from North Korea. The Ghauri I was first successfully test-launched in

April 1998. Pakistani defence sources indicate that limited production of the Ghauri

began in late 2002 and that it entered into service in January 2003, although devel-

opmental work was still continuing. A Ghauri II (or Hatf-5A) missile is under devel-

opment by the NDC and the KRL and will feature improved propellants and a new

motor assembly. The status of the programme is unclear. Pakistan is also reportedly

developing a Ghauri III missile with a design range of 3500 km, which would make it

the longest-range ballistic missile in the country’s inventory. In May 2004 Pakistani

officials indicated that the first test-launch of the Ghauri III would be conducted in

the near future; however, the test had not taken place by the end of 2005. Some ana-

116

For a description of Pakistan’s missile design and production capabilities see Kampani, G.,

‘Pakistan profile: missile overview’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles, updated Feb. 2005,

URL <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/index_3066.html>.

117

Takeishi, E., ‘Bhutto: we bought missile technology’, Asahi Shimbun (Internet edn), 19 July 2004,

URL <http://www.asahi.com/english/world/TKY200407190155.html>.

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lysts have speculated that the Ghauri III may either be a North Korean Taepodong

missile or draw extensively on components and technologies from the latter pro-

gramme.

118

On 11 August 2005 Pakistan carried out the first test-flight of a ground-launched

cruise missile, designated the Babur (Hatf-7), at a new test range in Baluchistan.

119

Pakistani officials indicated that the 500-km range cruise missile was capable of

carrying a nuclear warhead, although it has not been confirmed that the Babur will

have a nuclear role.

118

Kampani (note 116).

119

Sharif, A., ‘Pakistan test-fires its first cruise missile’, Dawn (Internet edn), 12 Aug. 2005, URL

<http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/12/top2.htm>.

Table 13A.8. Pakistani nuclear forces, January 2006

Range

Payload

Type

(km)

(kg)

Status

Aircraft

F-16A/B

1 600

4 500

32 aircraft, deployed in 3 squadrons;

most likely aircraft to have a nuclear

delivery role

Ballistic missiles

Ghaznavi (Hatf-3)

290

500

Entered service with Pakistani Army in

2004. Believed to be a copy of M-11

missile acquired from China in 1990s

Shaheen I (Hatf-4)

600–800

750–1 000

Entered service with Pakistani Army in

2003

Ghauri I (Hatf-5)

1 200

700–1 000

Entered service with Pakistani Army in

2003

Missile payloads may have to be reduced in order to achieve maximum range. Aircraft

range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight pro-

file and weapon loading.

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005

(Routledge: London, 2004); US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center

(NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (NAIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,

Aug. 2003), URL <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NAIC2003rev.pdf>; US Central

Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January

through

30 June

2002’,

Apr.

2003,

URL

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

bian/bian_apr_2003.htm>; US Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council,

‘Foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threat through 2015’ (unclassified

summary), Dec. 2001, URL <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassified

ballisticmissilefinal.pdf; ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various

issues; and Authors’ estimates.

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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON

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Strike aircraft

The aircraft of the Pakistani Air Force that is most likely to be used in the nuclear

weapon delivery role is the F-16. Other aircraft, such as the Mirage V or the Chinese-

produced A-5, could also be used.

Pakistan currently maintains 32 F-16s in service, deployed in 3 squadrons. In

1988–89 Pakistan had contracted with the USA to buy 71 F-16s to augment its exist-

ing inventory of 40 F-16A/B aircraft. However, in October 1990 the US Government

announced that it had embargoed any further deliveries in accordance with the

Pressler Amendment.

120

As a result, only 28 of the 71 aircraft were ever built and

none was delivered.

On 26 March 2005, the Bush Administration announced that it was notifying

Congress of plans to sell 75 F-16s to Pakistan.

121

US officials said that the deal, which

was intended to reward Pakistan for its cooperation in the war on terrorism, would not

affect the military balance in the region—in part because India would probably pro-

ceed with its own purchase of advanced aircraft, either from the USA or from another

supplier.

122

In August 2005 the Pakistani Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Air Staff

(Operations), Air Vice Marshal Shehzad Aslam Chaudary, said that the USA had

offered to give Pakistan two F-16 aircraft as a goodwill gesture; they arrived in

Pakistan before the end of the year. He added that the aircraft were not part of the

deal to purchase 75 F-16s from the USA.

123

In November 2005 Pakistan announced

that it would postpone the purchase in order to make available more financial

resources to provide relief to victims of the previous month’s devastating earth-

quake.

124

VIII. Israeli nuclear forces

The size of the Israeli nuclear weapon stockpile is unknown but is widely suggested

to contain 100–200 warheads. The Institute for Science and International Security

estimated in 2004 that Israel possessed some 0.56 tonnes of military plutonium,

125

the equivalent of about 110 warheads, each containing 5 kg of plutonium. Only part

of the plutonium may have been used, however, and the US Defense Intelligence

Agency estimated in 1999 that Israel had assembled 60–80 nuclear warheads.

126

Many analysts believe that Israel has a recessed nuclear arsenal (i.e., one that is stored

120

Approved by the US Congress in 1984, the Pressler Amendment barred military sales to foreign

countries unless the president could certify that the country was not pursuing the acquisition of nuclear

weapons.

121

Baker, P., ‘Bush: US to sell F-16s to Pakistan’, Washington Post (Internet edn), 25 Mar. 2005,

URL <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A800-2005Mar25.html>.

122

On international arms transfers see chapter 10 in this volume.

123

‘F-16 deal update’, PakistaniDefence.com, Aug. 2005, URL <http://www.pakistanidefence.com/

news/MonthlyNewsArchive/2005/August2005.htm>.

124

‘Musharraf postpones F-16 purchase to provide more quake relief’, Voice of America (VOA)

News (Internet edn), 4 Nov. 2005, URL <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-11/2005-11-

04-voa10.cfm?CFID=27784474&CFTOKEN=85289695>.

125

Albright, D. and Kramer, K., ‘Plutonium Watch: tracking plutonium inventories’, Institute for

Science and International Security, June 2004, URL <http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/

plutonium_watch2004.html >, p. 5.

126

US Defense Intelligence Agency (note 92). The DOD predicted that the Israeli stockpile in 2020

would consist of 65–85 weapons, suggesting that the stockpile is not increasing in size.

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but not armed, requiring some preparation before use); if true, the warheads for

Israel’s purported nuclear weapon delivery systems may not actually be deployed.

These delivery systems are believed to be strike aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles

and possibly SLCMs. There are also rumours that Isreal may have developed nuclear-

capable SLCMs for its Dolphin Class submarines and non-strategic nuclear weapons

such as nuclear artillery shells and atomic demolition munitions or landmines.

Table 13A.9. Israeli nuclear forces, January 2006

Range

Payload

Type

(km)

(kg)

Status

Aircraft

F-16A/B/C/D/I Falcon 1 600

5 400

205 aircraft in the inventory; some are

believed to be certified for nuclear weapon

delivery

Ballistic missiles

Jericho II

1 500–1 800

750–1 000

c. 50 missiles; first deployed in 1990; test-

launched 27 June 2001

Submarines

Dolphin

Rumoured to be equipped with nuclear-

capable cruise missiles; denied by Israeli

officials

Missile payloads may have to be reduced in order to achieve maximum range. Aircraft

range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight pro-

file and weapon loading.

Some of Israel’s 25 F-15I aircraft may also have a long-range nuclear delivery role.

The Shavit space launch vehicle, if converted to ballistic missile, could deliver a 775-kg

payload a distance of 4000 km. The Jericho I, first deployed in 1973, is no longer thought to

be operational.

Sources: Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press: New York, N.Y.,

1998); Albright, D., Berkhout, F. and Walker, W., SIPRI, Plutonium and Highly Enriched

Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford University Press:

Oxford, 1997); Lennox, D. (ed.), Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Jane’s Information

Group, Ltd: Coulsdon, 2003); Fetter, S., ‘Israeli ballistic missile capabilities,’ Physics and

Society, vol. 19, no. 3 (July 1990), pp. 3–4 (see ‘Ballistic missile primer’ (unpublished) for an

updated analysis, URL <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/Fetter/1990-MissilePrimer.pdf>); ‘NRDC

Nuclear Notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and Authors’ estimates.